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I 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Glendon employee, Steve Broadhead, told Merlin Page that Glendon's tender of 
three checks dated December 10, 12 and 20, 1990 did not constitute full payment of Page 
Electric's invoices. (Tr. 285-86). 
n. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A The "bid" contract was subsumed into the unexecuted "green" subcontracts. A 
party can become bound by an unexecuted contract if it otherwise demonstrates its 
acceptance of the contract. Page Electric failed to carry its burden of proving that it did not 
intend to be bound by the "green" subcontracts. The plans, specifications, job schedules, and 
prime contracts are part of the parties' agreements. 
B. Glendon tendered payment of more than the amount due at the time of tender. 
Glendon's tender was valid and Page Electric failed to object at the time of tender. 
C. Glendon assessed damages based on each subcontractor's pro-rata share of delay 
to the critical path schedule, not on the number of days worked beyond the completion 
deadline. The 3 month estimate of the length of the project in Glendon's acceptance letter 
was superseded by the plans, specifications, and construction schedule. 
D. The only evidence supporting the trial court's award for replacing damaged 
lighting is the implausible testimony of Kelly Page. The trial court mistakenly relied on the 
uncontroverted testimony of change orders on the Murray store to support its denial of a 
setoff for liquidated and additional damages. 
E. This court lacks jurisdiction to consider Page Electric's attack on the trial court's 
findings and conclusions because Page Electric failed to timely file a notice of cross-appeal 
pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
m. 
ARGUMENT 
A. ALTHOUGH UNEXECUTED, THE "GREEN" SUBCONTRACTS, AND 
INCORPORATED DOCUMENTS, CONSTITUTE THE AGREEMENTS 
OF THE PARTIES. 
Page Electric agreed, in the subcontractor pre-qualification form, that if Glendon 
accepted Page Electric's bid, such acceptance would create a legally binding contract that 
incorporated the plans, specifications and written subcontract. (DEx. 21). Page Electric 
submitted a bid (PEx. 1) that Glendon accepted. (PEx. 4, 5 & Tr. 14-15). This "bid" 
contract was subsumed into the "green" subcontracts presented to Page Electric at, or before, 
the preconstruction meeting. (Tr. 67,163, DEx. 11). The "green" subcontracts incorporated 
the prime contracts, plans, specifications and job schedules. (DEx. 11, Tr. 272). 
Page Electric's brief argues that its bid, and Glendon's acceptance thereof, is the sole 
contract between the parties. (Appellee's brief at pp. 13-14). The argument side-steps Ohio 
Casualty's contention, that the terms in the subcontractor prequalification form are 
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incorporated into the "bid" contract, with a non-responsive "... [the] Subcontractor Pre-
qualification Form is primarily instructional...." (Brief of Appellee at p. 13). Page Electric 
claims the "green" subcontracts are invalid for lack of signatures. 
The trial court found that the "bid" contract incorporated the plans and specifications. 
(Tr. 321-22). It also found "that the documents at that time included the addendum for the 
heat tape". (Tr. 322). The addendum for the heat tape was attached to the prime contracts. 
(DEx. 17, 18, 19). Assumably, the trial court considered the prime contracts part of the 
parties' agreements. The trial judge said, "It was the agreement of the parties that progress 
payments would be made as those payments were received by the [sic] Glendon 
Corporation." (Tr. 323). Progress payments were mentioned only in paragraph 8 of the 
"green" subcontracts. (DEx. 11). The trial court's finding that the parties' agreement 
encompassed at least parts of the subcontracts and prime contracts, and the plans and 
specifications is irreconcilable with its statement that "[t]here was never any written 
agreement between the plaintiffs and Glendon Corporation". (Tr. 323). 
Page Electric's brief and the trial court's findings misapprehend the law of contract 
formation. In Mountain Fuel Supply v. Reliance Los. Co., 933 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1991), 
plaintiff obtained an insurance certificate from defendant that expressly incorporated certain 
terms and conditions of the certificate into an underlying insurance contract. Defendant's 
agent approved the certificate, which was prepared by plaintiff, but returned it unsigned. 
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The court noted, ff[o]ne can become bound by a contract without signing it if the intent to 
accept the contract has been demonstrated through other means, as was the case here". Id. 
at 889, citing, 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts section 185 (1991); Ercanbrackv. Crandall-Walker 
Motor Co., 550 P.2d 723 (Utah 1976) (dicta). 
In Ercanbrack, the Utah Supreme Court stated in dicta: 
With regard to plaintiffs contention that the defendant 
was bound by the terms of the "Vehicle Buyer's Order" even 
though an officer did not sign said order the plaintiff contends: 
It is fundamental contract law 
that the parties may become bound by the 
terms of a contract even though they did 
not sign the contract, where they have 
otherwise indicated their acceptance of 
the contract, or led the other party to 
so believe that they have accepted the 
contract. 
This is a sound principle of contract law but has no application in this case. 
Id at 725. (Emphasis added). 
Glendon's bid acceptance letters (PEx. 4, 5, Tr. 14-15) notified Page Electric of the 
subcontracts. At the preconstruction meeting, Glendon supervisor, Steve Lefler, instructed 
Kevin Page to sign and return the subcontracts. (Tr. 68, 161). He did not sign the 
subcontracts "[m]ostly because of not knowing what some of the items on the contract were 
and not wanting to sign something that we didn't, you know, didn't understand". (Tr. 68). 
Kevin Page never asked Glendon to explain the terms the Pages did not understand. 
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Glendon believed Page Electric accepted the terms of the "green" subcontracts. (Tr. 68,163-
64). The most incriminating evidence of Page Electric's intent to be bound by the 
subcontracts is that it proceeded with the electrical work on the Autozones. 
In City and County of Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 813 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 
1993), the court said: 
Although a party is not bound by an oral agreement 
if it does not intend to be bound until a formal document is 
executed, "the party arguing that the parties intended not to 
be bound until the execution of a formal writing has the burden 
of proving 'either that both parties understood they were not to 
be bound until the executed contract was delivered, or that the 
other party should have known that the disclaiming party did not 
intend to be bound before the contract was signed.'" 
Id, at 1481, citing PDL Vitari Corp. v. Olympus Industries, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 197, 206 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), quoting Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., Ill F.2d 257, 262 (2nd Cir. 
1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 828, 105 S.Ct. 110, 83 L.Ed.2d 54 (1984). The court used the 
four factors outlined in Olympus in determining there was insufficient evidence that the 
enforcing party should have known the other party did not intend to be bound. (In Olympus, 
a written contract was lacking, but in Adolph Coors the parties memorialized their 
agreement in writing. 813 F. Supp. at 1481 n. 2) The four factors are: "(1) whether the 
parties have stated an intention not to be bound absent an executed writing, (2) whether one 
party has performed partially and the other party has accepted such performance, (3) 
whether there are no issues left to be negotiated such that the signing of the contract is 
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merely ministerial, and (4) whether the agreement concerns complex business matters such 
that a written agreement would be the norm, not the exception." Id 
Applying these four factors to the instant case, Page Electric produced no evidence 
of a stated intention, either verbal or written, not to be bound absent an executed writing. 
Page Electric proceeded with the electrical work on the Autozones and Glendon accepted 
its performance. After receiving the "green" subcontracts, Page Electric did not raise any 
additional issues with Glendon. Signing was merely ministerial. The parties' agreement was 
not complex from Glendon's viewpoint. Page Electric may have considered it complex but 
it failed to express any concern to Glendon. In sum, Page Electric failed to prove that it did 
not intend to be bound by the "green" subcontracts. 
Glendon's incorporation of the plans, specifications, job schedule, and prime contracts 
into the parties' agreement binds Page Electric by the terms of these documents even though 
they were not physically attached to the Subcontractor Prequalification Form and/or "green" 
subcontracts. 
...An agreement may be a single contract even though it consists of 
several writings that the parties have never physically attached to 
each other....If the parties intended to create one contract, the 
number of documents that memorialize the agreement is irrelevant... 
Sacramento Baseball v. Gr. N. Baseball 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987). 
B. GLENDON MADE A VALID TENDER THAT WAS REJECTED BY 
PAGE ELECTRIC. 
Glendon's payment policy has always been to pay invoices received on or before the 
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25th of any given month by the 25th of the following month. This policy is qualified by two 
contractual conditions: (1) 10% retainage until completion; and (2) Glendon's receipt of 
payment from the owner. (Tr. 274-77, DEx. 11 par. 8). Glendon sent Page Electric three 
checks totalling $18,067.80 on December 10, 12, and 20, 1990. (DEx. 2). 
Page Electric's invoices; No. 003140 dated 10/18/90, No. 003142 dated 10/23/90, and 
No. 003143 dated 10/23/90, were payable November 25, 1990. These invoices totalled 
$15,273.66. Page Electric's invoices; No. 003152 dated 11/07/90, No. 003158 dated 11/07/90, 
No. 003168 dated 11/16/90, No. 003177 dated 11/20/90, and No. 003183 dated 11/30/90, were 
payable December 25, 1990. These invoices totalled $16,533.24. (PEx. 9). 
Glendon's president, Glen Adams, testified that the October invoices were not paid 
on November 25 because Glendon had not received payment from the owner. In 
December, Glendon actually sent more money than was payable on the October invoices. 
Adams did this to encourage Page Electric to finish its work. (Tr. 274-77). 
The November invoices were not due and payable at the time Glendon tendered $18, 
067.80. Page Electric, however, held the checks until long after the November invoices came 
due, then rejected Glendon's tender claiming it was insufficient to cover both the October 
and November invoices. 
Sieverts v. White (Appellee's Brief at p. 10) is factually distinguishable. The plaintiffs 
in that case conditioned their tender on delivery of a Warranty deed. They also insisted that 
defendants come to their office to receive a check drawn on an account with insufficient 
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funds. Plaintiffs had no contractual right to make such demands. 
In the instant case, Glendon mailed the checks to Page Electric and there was no 
claim of insufficient funds. Page Electric made no attempt to negotiate the checks. The 
only condition of Glendon's tender was an acknowledgment and waiver in the endorsement 
provision of each check. 
Glendon actually met the requirements for a valid tender as outlined in Sieverts. 
Glendon had a right to an acknowledgment of full payment of the October invoices and 
waiver of any mechanic's and/or materialman's lien thereon. Glendon's tender was made 
in good faith and for Page Electric's benefit. 
In Estate ofKohlhepp v. Mason, 25 Utah 2d 155, 478 P2d. 339 (1970), the court said: 
It is well settled that a tender by check in lieu of cash is 
sufficient unless it is objected to on that ground. No objection 
was made to the check at the time it was delivered. Had it been, 
the defendants would have had an opportunity to substitute cash to 
obviate the objection. 
Id at 342. Page Electric did not object to the endorsement provision on the checks at the 
time they were delivered. Had it done so, Glendon could have revised the wording or 
substituted another form of payment. Appellee's brief overlooks Glendon's argument that 
the trial court erred in placing the burden of resolving the tender dispute on Glendon. 
C APPELLEE'S BRIEF MISAPPREHENDS GLENDON'S METHOD OF 
DETERMINING SUBCONTRACTOR DELAY AND ASSESSING 
DAMAGES. 
Appellee's brief misapprehends Glendon's method of determining subcontractor delay 
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to the project schedule and misquotes the testimony of Glendon employee, Steve Lefler, 
regarding delay. Page Electric was scheduled to work 9 days on the critical path of the 
Murray project. It actually spent 21 days and in the process caused 12.6% of the delay 
damages Glendon sustained. Page Electric was assessed its pro-rata share of damages based 
on delay to the critical path schedule, not on the number of days worked beyond the 
completion deadline. (Tr. 221-22, DEx. 9). Lefler did not "admit" that Page Electric could 
not work 9 straight days, he explained that Autozone had built hundreds of stores and used 
its experience to create a job schedule that Glendon used. The job schedule allotted 9 days 
for electrical work. Lefler testified that Page Electric did not timely perform "near the end 
of the projects". (Tr. 248-49) (See Appellee's brief at p. 5). 
Glendon's acceptance letter (PEx. 5, Appellee's brief addendum) estimated 3 months 
for the length of the project. The letter, however, included the following note: 
We do not guarantee the above phases and durations are final. 
However, we will do all possible to allow sufficient time to 
complete each phase. Exact duration and phases will be determined 
upon scheduling completion. 
(Emphasis added). The plans and specifications, and construction schedule required 
Glendon to substantially complete the Bountiful Autozone in 65 calendar days, and the 
Murray and Orem Autozones in 80 calendar days. (DEx. 15,16, Tr. 248-49)(5ee Appellee's 
brief at p. 14). 
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D. GLENDON PROPERLY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS. 
Glendon has marshalled the evidence supporting the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrated that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. The only evidence 
supporting the trial court's award of $338.47 per store for damaged or defective lighting is 
the implausible testimony of Kelly Page. (Appellant's brief at p. 28)(Tr. 107-09). The cost 
of the labor to replace five lighting ballasts would not be identical to the cost of the ballasts. 
Steve Lefler corroborated Kevin Page's testimony that there were two approved 
change orders on the Murray Autozone. (Tr. 193-94,81). This uncontroverted testimony was 
the sole evidentiary basis for the trial court's denial of a setoff for liquidated and additional 
damages. The court assumed that any delay caused while working on change orders would 
not be subject to setoff. Since the court could not discern whether Page Electric delayed 
work on change orders or the original contract, it denied any setoff. (Appellant's brief at p. 
23). Glendon demonstrated that the trial judge's reasoning was misguided and his 
evidentiary basis insufficient to support the findings. (Appellant's brief at p. 24). 
E. PAGE ELECTRIC FAILED TO CROSS APPEAL. 
This court lacks jurisdiction to consider Page Electric's attack on the trial court's 
findings and conclusions (Appellee's brief at pp. 8,14-15, 18) because Page Electric failed 
to timely file a notice of cross-appeal pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Hemetty v. Manti Gty Corp., 791 P2d. 506, 511 (Utah 1990). 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Ohio Casualty respectfully requests this Court to reverse the judgment and remand 
the case to the trial court with instructions to amend its findings and judgment as follows: 
a) Eliminate or reduce the award of prejudgment interest; 
b) Reduce the judgment by $1,263.16, the amount of liquidated and additional 
damages Glendon assessed to Page Electric; and 
c) Delete the awards of $338.47 per building on the Murray and Orem Autozones 
for replacing damaged or defective lighting. 
In the alternative, Ohio Casualty respectfully requests the Court to reverse and 
remand for a new trial due to insufficiency of the evidence to support the amount of 
judgment and/or error in law. 
Dated this day of December, 1993. 
Ronald E. Griffin 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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